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Certified Questions in the Supreme
Court: In Defense of an Option
Kent S. Bernard*
I. Introduction
A case may reach the Supreme Court in three ways:' appeal,
statutory certiorari, and certified questions.2 Certiorari and appeal
are well known and are initiated by litigants who are seeking
Supreme Court review of legal questions. Certified questions, on the
other hand, originate with the court ofappeals and allow them access
to Supreme Court wisdom so that the litigant will be assured that the
decision binding him is correct. Under statute, the Supreme Court
may review cases in the courts of appeals,
[b]y certification at any time by a court of appeals of any question
of law in any civil or criminal case as to which instructions are
desired, and upon such certification the Supreme Court may give
binding instructions or require the entire record to be sent up for
decision of the entire matter in controversy.
3
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I. Although 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970) (All Writs Statute) provides a fourth method, it can
hardly be called a normal procedure.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1970).
3. Id The procedure was necessitated by the structure of the judiciary under the first
Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73. The Act created a three tiered federal court system
that included circuit courts, but the Act did not provide judges to man them. Rather, those
courts were to be composed of two Supreme Court justices and one district judge. When the
Act of March 2, 1793, i Stat. 333-34, altered the makeup of the circuit court by providing that
the attendance of one Supreme Court justice would suffice, however, some procedure was
necessary to break impasses since the circuit court could have an even number of members.
The 1793 Act provided that when the justice and the judge split upon a final hearing or
jurisdictional plea, the case should be continued. At the second hearing a different justice
should be used, and if another split occurred, judgment would be rendered in accordance with
the opinion of the presiding judge. But the Act of 1802, 2 Stat. 159-61 § 6, assigned each
Supreme Court Justice to a designated circuit. Thus, the same judge and justice would be
hearing the case after it had been continued, and the deadlock could remain. Since no proce-
dure was available for either borrowing another circuit's justice or changing district judges,
certification was necessary to avoid the possibility of endless deadlock. Moore & Vestal, res-
ent and Potential Role of Certifcation in Federal Appellate Procedure, 35 VA. L. REV. 1, 10-14
(1949).
A similar but more limited section allows certification of questions
from the court of claims,4 and the Court has implemented the statute
by promulgating a rule to govern certification procedure.'
Although the Court decided a certified question as recently as
1974,6 the next most recent case in which a certificate was accepted
occurred in 1964,1 and over eighteen years had elapsed between that
case and its most recent predecessor.' Thus, some commentators be-
lieve that certification should be abolished since it is rarely used.9
This article, however, argues that the procedure serves a definite and
appropriate function in our legal system and should be retained.
II. Application of the Procedure
In this century the courts of appeals have used certification spar-
ingly, m0 seemingly as a result of the feeling that the Supreme Court is
still soured by the early abuse of the procedure." As commentators
have pointed out, even in cases in which the courts of appeals are in
doubt about the correctness of their rulings, litigants must now rely
on review by certiorari, which is not primarily concerned with the
litigants interests.'" Whether a question is to be certified is entirely
4. Id § 1255. The Court cannot bring up the whole case from the court of claims, since
that court is one of original jurisdiction. Otherwise, the certification would be an unauthorized
extension of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. See Wheeler Lumber Bridge & Supply
Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 572, 573 (1930); Moore & Vestal, supra note 3, at 9.
5. Sup. Ct. R. 28.
6. Moody v. Albermarle Paper Co., 417 U.S. 622 (1974). See text accompanying note
60, infra.
7. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964).
8. United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742 (1946).
9. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS, 534 (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as C.
WRIGHT]; Moore & Vestal, supra note 4, at 42-45.
10. See Moore & Vestal, supra note 3, at 46-49. A survey of the post 1949 case law
confirms that this attitude has not changed significantly. Wright notes that the Second Circuit
refuses to certify questions except in cases in which the point is involved in another appeal
already pending before the Supreme Court. C. WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 534.
11. See Evans, Ffty Years of the United States Circuit Court fAppeals, 9 Mo. L. REV.
189, 202 n.72 (1944). A question is certified by a vote of the majority of the judges hearing it.
See United States v. Barnett, 330 F.2d 369, 383 (5th Cir. 1963) (en banc).
In their article tracing the history of the procedure, J. Moore and A. Vestal point out that
despite the limited purpose and scope of certification the procedure was often abused. After
the Judiciary Act of 1802, circuit courts began to certify questions in almost a pro forma fash-
ion since they had nothing to lose by doing so. If the Court agreed with the circuit judge's
view of the question, the judge was pleased, and if the Court disagreed, the judge merely
would conform his views to the Court's, avoiding a reversal. As a result of this abuse, the
Court in the mid-nineteenth century, became rigidly opposed to certification except when a
real division had occurred below on a question of law. Moore & Vestal, supra note 3, at 12-14.
12. Moore & Vestal, supra note 3, at 22. Certiorari, although dependent upon litigants
for invocation, is really a way for the Court to determine which legal questions deserve its
opinion. The fact that a given question is crucial to a litigant has no bearing on whether the
Court will choose to hear it. Sup. Ct. R. 19(1).
The failure of the courts of appeals to use certification more often has prompted Moore
and Vestal to say that
[a] deeper appreciation of this situation should indicate to the courts of appeals that
they have a definite obligation to assure themselves in cases of substantial doubt that
the decision they render is correct, although this means a greater use of certification.
up to the lower court.13 The parties have no power to invoke the
process; they can only ask the court to employ it.14 Although in the-
ory the Supreme Court is required to take certified questions, most
certificates are rejected in practice.' 5 Moreover, the Supreme Court
has made it clear that it need not give reasons for its dismissals of
'improper' certifications, even though reasons have been provided on
some occasions for the edification of the lower courts.' 6
A. Limitations on the Certfcation Procedure
1. Supreme Court Rule 28.-Despite the absence of any statutory
restrictions, except the requirement that the question certified be "of
law," the Court has established its own restrictions to delimit a
proper certification. Most of these restrictions are now embodied in
Supreme Court Rule 28, which provides that questions must be dis-
tinct and that the certificate itself must contain a precise statement of
the nature of the cause and the facts upon which the legal issues are
grounded."i The Court will consider only the facts stated in the cer-
tificate,' 8 and these must be ultimate facts as opposed to evidentiary
facts or evidence from which factual inferences are to be drawn.' 9
Thus, the Court has often dismissed certificates because they im-
properly involved questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and
law. 20
Clearly, the Court regards certificates as discretionary rather
than mandatory invocations of its jurisdiction. An issue containing
more than one narrow question or proposition of law cannot be cer-
tified,2 1 and the phrase "objectionable generality" has sounded the
death knell of many attempts to invoke the high court's guidance.22
Moore & Vestal, supra note 3, at 22 (emphasis in original).
13. See, e.g., Rutherford v. American Medical Ass'n, 379 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1967); Ger-
man Ins. Co. v. Hearne, 118 F. 134 (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1902); Andrews v. National Fotindry, 77 F.
774 (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1897).
This is one of the major criticisms of certification to the Supreme Court-that a court of
appeals can control the Supreme Court's docket since the Supreme Court is required to accept
a certificate. See accompanying notes 71-85, infra
14. Rutherford v. American Medical Ass'n, 379 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1967).
15. A review of certification cases demonstrates this. Thus, the Court's defacto discre-
tion would seem to provide a complete answer to commentators who find it improper for the
lower courts to decide which questions the Supreme Court must hear. See C. WRIGHT, supra
note 9, at 534; Moore & Vestal, supra note 3, at 42. The Court has established control over
which cases and questions it hears.
16. See, e.g., Busby v. Electric Utility Employees Union, 323 U.S. 72 (1944); N.L.R.B. v.
White Swan Co., 313 U.S. 23 (1941).
17. Sup. Ct. R. 28.
18. Stratton's Independence v. Houbert, 231 U.S. 399, 422 (1913).
19. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. Artic Iron Co., 248 U.S. 178 (1918).
20. See, e.g., Pflueger v. Sherman, 293 U.S. 55, 57-58 (1934).
21. Quinlan v. Green County, 205 U.S. 410 (1907).
22. See, e.g., Pflueger v. Sherman, 293 U.S. 55 (1934).
In NL.RB. v. White Swan Co.,23 for example, the court of appeals
certified questions concerning the validity of a National Labor Rela-
tions Board order. The case hinged on whether the Board had juris-
diction over the employer. The first question certified read as
follows:
Should the NLRA [National Labor Relations Act] be interpreted
as having application to a business of purely local character, such
as a laundry, merely because such business is located in a city on a
state line and derives a substantial portion of its income from
business which involves collections or deliveries of articles in a
state other than that in which the business is located?
24
The Court dismissed the certification, noting that the question certi-
fied was both hypothetical and abstract. As the Court said,
The questions do not focus "the controversy in its setting."
From the certificate we do not know on what grounds the Board
based its jurisdiction. . . .The terms "business of a purely local
character" and "local business" are meaningful for purposes of
[section] 10(a) of the Act only in light of specific findings of the
Board. . . .Since the questions certified do not reflect the precise
conclusions of the Board and the precise findings on which those
conclusions were based, they necessarily have an "objectionable
generality.",
25
Thus, the Court will not consider abstract questions of law, but
requires sufficient facts to permit a determination of the lower court's
findings. Therefore, Wright's criticism that the procedure "bring[s]
to the Court abstract questions of law, divorced from a complete fac-
tual setting in which they may be more carefully explored,"26 seems
misguided. The Court has rejected certificates on just that ground.
27
2. Potentially Unnecessary Questions.-Closely related to the re-
quirement that the question be concrete is the Court's refusal to an-
swer a question that would be decisive of the cause only if a question
of local law, as yet unanswered by the court of appeals, receives one
particular answer rather than another. 28 The Court noted,
It is not the function of the certificate . .. to require this
Court to answer questions not shown to be necessary to the deci-
sion of the case. A question will not be answered if it is hypotheti-
cal or if it is dependent upon other questions which may not
appropriately be answered. This Court will not answer a question
which will not arise in the pending controversy unless another is-
sue, not yet resolved by the certifying court, is decided in a partic-
ular way.29
23. 313 U.S. 23 (1941).
24. Id at 26.
25. Id at 27.
26. C. WRiGHT, supra note 9, at 534.
27. It is not suggested, however, that the Court be forced to take any question simply
because a court of appeals certifies it.
28. Busby v. Electric Utility Employees Union, 323 U.S. 72 (1944).
29. Id at 75.
The basic principle here seems entirely sound. The Supreme Court
does not sit to dispense gratuitous advice upon command. Before a
court of appeals certifies a question, it should make very sure that
the answer will help decide the controversy before it. The strict con-
stitutional principle that the Court does not give advisory opinions
applies to requests from courts as well as presidents.3 ° And since
questions are certified, rather than entire cases, the lower court
should make those questions discrete and answerable.
3. Decisions Affecting the Entire Case.-The Court also has an-
nounced that it will not accept certified questions calling for decision
of the entire case,3 yet it will pass on "definite" and "clean cut"
questions of law even though "the answer may be decisive of the
controversy. '32 This amgibuous distinction suggests that the Court is
keeping its options open and flexible and may be viewed as a part of
the Court's hostility toward both general and hypothetical questions.
Since the certification procedure is designed to aid the lower court in
deciding a case by having the Supreme Court resolve specific ques-
tions of law, the Court will not allow the procedure to be used as a
short-cut certiorari. The whole case may come up for Supreme
Court review later, if such review is appropriate.
This argument, although clear, is not satisfactory. Both the cer-
tification and certiorari procedures allow Supreme Court review of
specific questions not initially posed by the Court itself. It is surely
disingenuous to say that a question of law permissible on certiorari is
impermissible on certification because the certification procedure is
not meant to decide cases. As the legislative history and context
show, deciding cases is exactly what the draftsmen hoped for-at the
court of appeals level. If the Supreme Court, by answering a certifi-
cate, can allow a case to be resolved finally at the level of the certify-
ing court, the statutory scheme is working as planned. And if a
certified question is not abstract or hypothetical, is necessary to the
outcome of the case, and is properly focused on a point of law, the
Court's decision almost inevitably will be decisive of the case.3 3
30. See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHS-
LER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 64-70 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited
as HART & WECHSLER].
31. C.A.B. v. American Air Transp., 344 U.S. 4, 5 (1952); News Syndicate Co. v. New
York Cent. Ry. Co., 275 U.S. 179, 188 (1927).
32. United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 66 (1914).
33. An alternative rationale for the distinction was suggested as follows:
The point seems to be that the Supreme Court will accept only those certifications of
single and distinct points of law which do not in effect cause it to do all the work of
the lower court, although certifications of crucial issues are not, of course, excluded.
R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, 388 (4th ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited
as R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN].
This may be an accurate description of how the Justices reason, even though it does not
4. Resolutions of Intracircuit Conflicts.-Probably the most puz-
zling reason for dismissing certifications is that the Court will not
accept questions to resolve conflicts within a given circuit.34 The
leading case, Wisniewski v. United States,35 concerned the construc-
tion of a treasury regulation under which the defendant had been
convicted. The court of appeals certified the following question:
"Does the phrase 'any substance' as employed in 26 C.F.R., section
175.121, 1952 Cumulative Pocket Supplement, include tax paid dis-
tilled spirits?"36 The question met all the tests enumerated by the
Court: it was concrete, limited, essential to the case, of law, and not a
matter of discretion, and it did not entail taking up the whole case.
Nevertheless, the Court dismissed the certificate on the ground that
another panel of the same court of appeals had decided the same
question in an earlier case. The Court said, "It is primarily the task
of a Court of Appeals to reconcile its internal difficulties.
37
This case is unique since the Court apparently admitted that
nothing was wrong with the certificate itself. If this is true, however,
then the Court would seem to have had an obligation to take the
certificate since the certification statute gives the lower court the
power to certify questions. Although it can be argued that a certain
amount of flexibility must be left for the Supreme Court to set down
the requirements of the questions themselves, the Court should not
reject a validly formed question simply because the Court feels that
other circumstances make it more appropriate for the lower court to
decide the question for itself. Even ignoring the spirit of the certifi-
cation procedure, this practice appears to violate the letter of the
statute.
Although it is common knowledge that the Court dislikes its
'mandatory' jurisdiction, this does not seem a sufficient explanation
for the intracircuit dismissals; the Court may be avoiding a constitu-
tional issue. It is unclear how far Congress can delegate its legisla-
tive power without standards to the courts of Appeals and thereby
make jurisdiction mandatory on the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court has appellate jurisdiction subject to congressional exception.
This has come to mean that the Court can hear a vast variety of
cases, but it may choose which ones to take. Congress had made
jurisdiction mandatory in certain areas. Yet these have been areas in
which it is the issue that has been deemed important enough to war-
help the courts of appeals to predict with certainty which certificate will be accepted by the
Court. Another possible alternative is that the ambiguity of standards is deliberate and reflects
the Court's desire to avoid a potentially thorny constitutional question about congressional
power over the judiciary. See text following note 37, infra
34. See e.g., Wisniewski v. United States, 353 U.S. 901 (1957).
35. Id
36. Id
37. Id at 902.
rant Supreme Court attention on a nondiscretionary basis. Certifica-
tion, however, does not depend on the characterization of a question
under any specific issue (such as the constitutional challenge re-
quired to convene a three-judge court). Rather, the statute gives to
the courts of appeals an unfettered discretion to determine the ques-
tions that are to be heard by the Supreme Court.38 Admittedly, the
questions must be formed with an exactitude reminiscent of com-
mon-law pleading, but once they are so formed then Congress ap-
pears to have said that the Court must hear them. This delegation of
congressional power raises serious questions about the institutional
power of the Supreme Court to control its own operation. Although
it is unclear whether Congress' power to make exceptions to j urisdic-
tion entails the power to make certain jurisdiction mandatory, the
Court does not seem to want to confront that issue, especially not
when what has been made mandatory is arguably the prime function
of the Court--deciding constitutional issues. Thus, it is at least plau-
sible that it is to avoid facing just this question that the Supreme
Court adopted the power to dismiss certificates for reasons totally
extraneous to the questions certified.
Furthermore, even if the rule is sound in principle, framing it to
encompass all intracircuit conflicts is too broad. In the case of the
treasury regulation noted above, the Court's action left all parties in
an intolerable situation.
Conceptually, there can be only one correct interpretation [of the
regulation involved]. If there is doubt as to the proper interpreta-
tion of a substantive statute within a jurisdiction, it is left to the
defining or controlling court eventually to accord the statute its
proper significance. No good reason is perceived why the issue
should not be decided early by the "least cumbersome and most
expeditious" method of the certified question rather than waiting
for the question to arise on a writ of certiorari.39
With this type of question, it was more important to have an answer
than to be assured that the answer that one had was correct. In ef-
fect, two lower courts were conflicting on the question, which was of
national scope and one that other courts were likely to find trouble-
some. Requiring all active circuit judges of the circuit to convene
specially to decide the question' seems extravagant, especially when
the question itself was so "pure" and of such national moment. The
requirements that now couch certifications, the discretion that the
Supreme Court has claimed in reviewing them, and the reticence of
38. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 534 (3d ed. 1976).
39. Casenote, 43 IOWA L. REV. 432, 435 (1958) (footnote omitted).
40. See Louisell & Degnan, Rehearing in American Appellate Courts, 25 F.R.D. 143, 163
(1960). See generally Note, En Banc Procedure in the Federal Courts of Appeals, I II U. PA. L.
REV. 220 (1962).
the lower courts to certify questions at all afford ample protection
against an abuse of the procedure.4 At present, the Court will de-
cide only a question upon which more than one circuit has passed42 ,
but will not decide the same question if two panels in the same cir-
cuit have divided over it.43 As a general rule this practice cannot be
justified. A split between panels of the ninth circuit may have far
greater impact than one between the eighth and tenth circuits.
Moreover, there is certainly no reason to suppose a priori that
Supreme Court aid is needed only in the latter case.
B. The Court Reaffirms the Procedure
The most recent case in which a certificate has been accepted
appears both to support and ignore the rules that the Court has de-
veloped for certified questions. In Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co. 44
an appeal from a trial court judgment was heard by a panel of the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which contained senior judges.
The losing parties petitioned for a rehearing en banc. All the circuit
judges, including the senior judges in question, certified the question
whether a senior judge of the circuit who was a member of the origi-
nal panel hearing a case may vote to determine whether the case
should be reheard en banc. The Supreme Court accepted the certifi-
cate and held that such a judge may not so participate. In accepting
the certificate the Court reaffirmed the original purpose of certifica-
tion, albeit under peculiar circumstances.
The certificate did not suggest that either one of the litigants
argued that senior judges should or should not sit. Apparently, this
point was raised by the lower court sua sponte. In this sense it was a
41. This is not to suggest that the Court be used to decide the normal run of lower court
problems; most commentators agree that the Court's workload has reached the point at which
reform is needed. See, e.g., G. CASPER & R. POSNER, THE WORKLOAD OF THE SUPREME
COURT xi n.2 (1976), which contains a list of no fewer than nineteen studies and articles deal-
ing with the gravity of the workload problem and the appropriate measures to cope with it.
Obviously, neither the members of the Court nor the commentators agree with Justice Doug-
las' statement that "no Justice of this Court need work more than four days a week to carry out
his burden." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 519 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
In their own study, which examines the Court's workload problem through systematic and
empircal social science methods, Professors Casper and Posner conclude that the Court's
workload has not "reached the point at which radical changes in the Court's jurisdiction or in
the structure of federal appellate review should be contemplated," yet they endorse the com-
monly held view that the Supreme Court's remaining obligatory jurisdiction be abolished. G.
CASPER & R. POSNER, THE WORKLOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT 117 (1976).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Woo Jan, 245 U.S. 552 (1918).
43. See, e.g., Wisniewski v. United States, 353 U.S. 901 (1957).
Closely related to this is the long settled rule of practice that certification is improper to
decide questions relating to matters of pure discretion in the lower court. United States v.
Rosenberg, 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 580 (1868). The Court has declined to decide a question about
the internal procedure of a court of appeals, In re Burnwell, 350 U.S. 521 (1956), or whether a
new trial should be granted. United States v. Daniel, 6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 542 (1921). But see
United States v. Thomas, 151 U.S. 577 (1864) (Court answered certified question regarding a
motion for a new trial).
44. 417 U.S. 622 (1974), aft'don the merits, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
textbook certificate-a question raised by the court of appeals rather
than by a litigant. Nevertheless, the issue was purely hypothetical.
Nothing indicates that the votes of the senior judges would have
made the slightest difference. Seven active and two senior judges
were on the Fourth Circuit. If five of the active judges voted as a
block, any questions as to the status of the senior judges need not
have been faced. But as far as the record shows (and the Supreme
Court is supposed to be limited to the facts in the certificate), no
evidence is available that a vote was ever taken. Thus, the situation
hardly seemed to provide the best case to reaffirm the purpose of the
certified question procedure.
Two grounds upon which the decision to take this certificate
seem supportable, however.4" First, the issue was clear, unclouded
by factual controversy, and framed in such a manner that it was
quite plausible to believe that no litigant would ever raise it. Thus,
procedurally, certification might have been thought the only means
of decision. Of course, these same considerations apply to a large
variety of requests for advisory opinions and could suggest that the
question was not particularly important. Second, the Court may
have been showing a new willingness to tolerate certificates that ac-
tually reflect a question from the lower court rather than a litigant.
Thus, the decision can be viewed strictly as a vehicle to reaffirm the
validity of the procedure.
The view that the Court is relaxing its standards for accepting a
certified question is more satisfying intellectually and nicely relates
to earlier complaints about the abuse of certification.' Most at-
tempted certificates reflect contentions of the parties; this one may
have been the clearest example possible of a question in which the
parties had no stake. Although this was dangerously close to an ad-
visory opinion, the votes of the senior judges may have made a dif-
ference and thus provided a clear controversy.
Moreover, viewing the Court's acceptance of the certificate as a
reaffirmation of the procedure is sensible. The certificate met all of
the tests that the Court has laid out. The issue was distinct, one of
law, not vague or general, and not dispositive only if an unanswered
question of local law received a particular answer.47 Furthermore, it
fit the statutory definition and purpose by being a question raised by
the court of appeals itself. Finally, it would make no sense to pre-
45. Another explanation, which is admittedly unverifiable and Machiavellian, is that the
Court is demonstrating that it is independent from the lower courts and Congress; by selecting
a particularly unlikely case to reaffirm the procedure, the Court is reminding the courts of
appeals that no predictability can be expected in this area.
46. See note 11 supra.
47. See text accompanying notes 34, 37-39, 44 supra.
serve the issue for possible later determination on the merits of the
case. If the "wrong" judge participated below, then any en banc pro-
ceeding arguably was void, and the decision coming out of the pro-
ceeding was a nullity. No matter what the result at the court of
appeals level, it would have been especially difficult and time con-
suming to try to unravel it later.
III. Is Certification Necessary?
If the certification procedure were somehow necessary to enable
the Supreme Court properly to discharge its function in our judicial
structure, no further justification for retaining the procedure would
be needed. Research and analysis indicate, however, that there is no
constitutional or institutional compulsion for certification. It is this
writer's view that there is no case for which certification provides the
only available means for a hearing.
Although such a negative statement is not susceptible of abso-
lute proof, it can still be made persuasive if one takes what arguably
was the most compelling case for the need for certification and can
show how it could have been resolved in the absence of certification.
While Moody, discussed above, has its peculiarities, this writer be-
lieves that United States v. Barnett 8 is that "most compelling case."
In Barnett, the court of appeals enjoined Governor Barnett
from interfering with the attempts of Blacks to enter the University
of Mississippi. The injunction was disobeyed, Barnett was held in
civil contempt,49 and finally, the court, sua sponte, authorized the
United States to prosecute an action for criminal contempt against
the Governor. 0 For reasons unexplained in the reported opinion,
the Fifth Circuit entered an order constituting the court en banc for
all matters relating to the criminal contempt proceedings.5' While
this action may have been a reasonable expression of respect for the
gubernatorial defendant, it led to a 4-4 split in the court on the issue
whether Barnett had the right to a jury trial.52 Actually, certification
provided the outlet for the court,53 but for the sake of inquiry, the
question is asked whether the case could have been resolved had
there been no certification procedure available. This question can be
answered affirmatively. The extraordinary writ54 of mandamus was
both practicably and theoretically capable of resolving the Barnett
48. 376 U.S. 681 (1964). For a complete recitation of the facts, see 330 F.2d 369, 369-385
(5th Cir. 1963) (En Banc).
49. The penalty was monetary only;, he was not jailed. 330 F.2d 369, 376 (5th Cir. 1963).
50. Id at 381.
51. Id at 382.
52. Judge Hutchenson was ill and not sitting.
53. The Supreme Court answered the certificate in the negative.
54. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970).
case without doing excessive violence to normal Court practice. 5
The question of standing presents no difficulty. The United
States would appear to be the logical choice to petition for the writ
since it had already been appointed to prosecute the action. By stat-
ute the United States now is permitted to appeal the denial of a crim-
inal contempt application.56 Here, although the application may not
have been technically denied, the Government still had not been
granted the relief sought. The concept that the Government can seek
mandamus to compel a decision in a situation in which it could ap-
peal that decision itself if it were to be adverse is entirely consonant
with the law and its purposes even though Congress may never have
envisioned this particular case. Moreover, absent this statutory au-
thority, the Government could have argued standing based on the
court's lack of action, rather than its denial of the application, claim-
ing that the Court "refused" to act on the petition.
Some problems are hidden in the nature of Supreme Court
mandamus itself, however. The writ is not often used, and the Court
is apparently reluctant to issue it to another court. Hence, the law in
this area is unclear.
Traditionally, mandamus is available only when no other ade-
quate remedy exists, as in the Barnett case.57 This does not mean
that the Government could count on obtaining the writ, since
Supreme Court mandamus is not easily acquired. Generally, the
writ is available to resolve situations in which a lower court has juris-
55. It is not pretended that the proposed procedure is obvious, but it does seem a legiti-
mate exercise of Court power under the Constitution and would be adaptable to just this type
of extraordinary situation. See generally Wolfson, Extraordinary Remedies in the Supreme
Court Since Ex Parte Peru, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 977 (1951); Note Federal Court Review by
Extraordinary Writ, 63 YALE L.J: 105 (1953).
Two other solutions, which may have been possible theoretically, were not at all practica-
ble. One approach would be to have the Court grant certiorari before judgment in the court of
appeals. cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (A district court order requiring the
President to produce evidence is an appealable order because it would be improper to require
the President to disobey an order of the judiciary to gain review); 28 U.S.C. § 1241(1) (1970)
(Supreme Court may grant writ of certiorari before or after rendition of the judgment in a case
before the court of appeals). But when the action originated in the court of appeals, there is a
significant probability that, if the Supreme Court decided the case, it would be unlawfully
expanding its original jurisdiction. Chandler v. Judicial Council of the 10th Circuit, 398 U.S.
74 (1970); United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 747 (1946).
Likewise, the solution in Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), of hav-
ing Congress pass emergency legislation setting up a procedure for the courts to follow must be
set aside. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 77-78 (1967). Were this the only way out, it
could be argued that certification was "necessary" at least under existing law, since the situa-
tion in Barnett is precisely the type of situation that needs a permanent, not a temporary,
procedure.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 3131 (1970); see United States v. Hoffman, 335 U.S. 77 (1948); United
States v. Goldman, 277 U.S. 229 (1928).
57. Ex Parte Newman, 81 U.S. 152 (1871); see also Sloss, Mandamus in the Supreme
Court since the Judiciary Act of 1925, 46 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1932).
The use of other extraordinary writs is tacitly rejected; none seem more appropriate than
mandamus, and the availability of another writ should not bar the use of mandamus here.
diction but refuses to decide a case. Mandamus is the proper tool to
compel the court to make a decision.58 Recently, it has been used to
compel a trial court to act on an indictment. 59 This seems to parallel
the situation in the Barnett case; for whatever reason, the court re-
fused to act on the case before it. Assuming that the United States
can seek the writ and that the Supreme Court can and would have
the writ issued, the real question is what would the writ command?
The Court could not legitimately decide this case itself"° since
the problem of the illegitimate expansion of the Court's original ju-
risdiction would not be lifted merely by denominating the action
"mandamus." Thus, all that the Supreme Court could do would be
to command the lower court to act. Even if the jurisdictional re-
straint did not bar the Court from directing a decision in a given
way, however, it is quite clear that mandamus was never meant for
this role. The writ is not issued to direct a judgment, but only to
direct that there be a judgment by the lower court." Nevertheless,
the Court would be well within its power in ordering the Fifth Cir-
cuit to devise its own means for breaking the deadlock. For exam-
ple, the Court could order the Chief Judge or the court as a whole to
send the case to an odd numbered panel ofjudges, chosen as they see
fit.62 Although technically a "decision," such an order in no way
involves the merits of the right to jury trial question and, hence, does
not involve the original jurisdiction problem.63
Moreover, positive support exists for granting mandamus in this
situation. Recently, the Supreme Court has expanded the use of
mandamus as a supervisory tool,' based on the idea that mandamus
is appropriate to correct actions of the lower courts that are, in some
ill-defined sense, beyond their powers. 65 The concept of 'power' is
not used literally; what is meant is that the lower court violated an
important rule in a situation in which the higher court does not want
58. See Ex Parte Kawto, 317 U.S. 69 (1942); Ex Parle Harding, 219 U.S. 363 (1911); Ex
Par'e Newman, 81 U.S. 152 (1871).
59. United States v. Kysar, 459 F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1972)
60. See note 54 supra
61. See, e.g., Ex Parle Newman, 81 U.S. 152 (1871); Jackson v. Choate, 404 F.2d 910(5th
Cir. 1968); The Rural Electrification Case, 373 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1967).
62. Seniority is a likely method, and perhaps the Supreme Court could order it to be
used. Out of deference for its judicial colleagues, however, the Court probably would not be
so specific; the case is unusual enough without the Supreme Court's experimenting further
with its orders.
63. This suggestion is premised on the idea that just because a remedy is without prece-
dent does not bar its use in an equitable action. See I STORY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 28,
30 (14th ed. 1918); Rex v. Leicester Guardians, 2 Q.B. 632, 637-38 (1899).
64. See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964); LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., Inc.,
352 U.S. 249 (1957). See generally 9 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 110.27 (1970); Note,
Supervutory and Advisory Mandamus Under the All Writs Act, 86 HARV. L. REv. 595 (1973).
65. Note, supra note 64, at 611.
The courts of appeals have used the writ, especially in important cases of first impression.
See, e.g., In re Ellsberg, 446 F.2d 954 (1st Cir. 1971); see also Note, supra note 64, at 616.
to leave the law "in error" until another case comes up.66
There appears to be no reported case of a court of appeals hear-
ing an original action en banc, although the words of the statute do
seem to authorize the procedure.67 The strict reading, however, may
not be accurate. The court of appeals is authorized to hold hearings
or rehearings en banc. 68 Thus, the most reasonable construction of
the statute would assume that the intent of the drafters was focused
on the hearing or rehearing of appeals, not original suits in the ap-
pellate courts. It is hard to envision an instance, other than contempt
of court, in which this latter case would occur. Normally, if an ap-
peal is heard en banc and the judges split evenly, the lower court
decision is affirmed. In the situation of a rehearing en banc, the
panel decision is the base. But allowing an original action to be
heard en banc leaves no decision to be affirmed, and it seems incom-
prehensible that Congress intended this result.
Hence, the Fifth Circuit's procedure in Barnett arguably vio-
lated the spirit of the en banc statute. The court may have exceeded
its power in the present, expanded sense of the term. One could ar-
gue that the court was acting within its allowable discretion in con-
vening the court en banc and that there is no accepted procedure for
unconvening at this point since mandamus does not command the
impossible.69 Nevertheless, mandamus can apply to this situation.
When the primary relief sought is to compel a court to proceed and
determine a cause, that some orders already made in the case consti-
tute a formal obstacle will not prevent issuance of the writ. The writ
simply will be enlarged to compel the lower court to remove the or-
ders as ancillary to the relief sought.70 Thus, unless one argues that
the circuit court has no power to unconvene an en banc court, that
there is no accepted procedure for doing so is not a bar to use of the
writ.
In the Barnett situation, absent certification, there was no possi-
ble means to correct the lower court's action except by mandamus.
Current mandamus practice would seemingly have fully justified the
writ; the lower court's action was both new and wrong, and the issue
made the case too important for the Court to wait for it to come up
later. The extraordinary situation merited the use of the extraordi-
nary writ.
66. See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 110 (1964).
67. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1970).
68. Id
69. Perhaps the court can vote to dismiss the en banc convention as a matter of inherent
organizational power.
70. See, e.g., State ex rel. McGovern v. Williams, 136 Wis. 1, 10-12, 116 N.W. 225, 228
(1908).
IV. Defense of Certification
A. Argumentsfor Abolition Refuted
Since certified questions cannot be justified solely out of neces-
sity, policy considerations must be analyzed to decide the issue. Sev-
eral basic policy arguments have been advanced in favor of
abolishing the certification procedure entirely. Upon examination,
none of them is decisive, and all omit consideration of the root pur-
pose of certification itself.
1. The Supreme Court Should Control Its Own Docket.-
Certification is viewed as a threat to the Court's control of its own
docket because it is nominally a nondiscretionary review proce-
dure.71' This objection is not well taken although eminent commen-
tators espouse it. As this article demonstrates, and as the whole
history of certification clearly shows, whatever its mandatory nature,
the Court has exercised great discretion in deciding which certifica-
tions to accept. 2 Thus, the claim that certification is bad because it is
mandatory ignores the Court's treatment of certified questions.
A more substantial form of the objection, albeit one not raised
to date, is that certification is unconstitutional. As noted earlier, the
Court has avoided facing the question of whether Congress has the
power to make certain jurisdiction mandatory.73 But even assuming
that Congress has that power, it is an entirely different question
whether the certification procedure is a valid exercise of the power
that exists.
Normally, Congress makes jurisdiction mandatory when it con-
siders a substantive subject area important enough to justify the bur-
den on the Supreme Court.74 The certified question procedure,
however, is, in effect, a delegation of whatever power Congress has
to the courts of appeals, with no subject matter limitation. To the
extent that certified questions must be accepted, Congress has vested
control over the Supreme Court's docket in the lower courts, and
some commentators find this control objectionable.75 Nevertheless,
71. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 534; Casenote, 43 Iowa L. REV. 432, 433-34
(1958). The Court is strongly opposed to provisions requiring it to hear a given type of case.
The most conspicuous example is the Court's antipathy to three-judge courts. See, e.g., Gon-
zalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90 (1974).
72. See cases discussed in the text accompanying notes 14-37, supra, in which certifica-
tions were dismissed on various grounds. See generally R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra note
33, at § 9.2. For a more extensive list of cases, see the annotations in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1254
(1970).
73. See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra; Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit
Union, 419 U.S. 90 (1974) (Court noted the overriding policy of minimizing its mandatory
docket).
74. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1970) (decisions invalidating Acts of Congress); 28
U.S.C.§ 1253 (1970) (decisions of three-judge courts pursuant to § 2284); and 15 U.S.C. § 29
(1970) (antitrust cases involving the government).
75. C. WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 534; Moore & vestal, supra note 3, at 42-44.
the Court has claimed the power to reject certain certificates as a
means of avoiding a constitutional confrontation, and Congress has
either acquiesced or decided not to press the issue. Consequently, the
constitutional validity of the delegation continues to go unchal-
lenged even though the compromise does not nullify the constitu-
tional mandate of separation of powers.76 All can readily admit that
lethargy is a poor excuse for allowing a possible unconstitutional
practice to continue.
Any argument that the certification power granted to the courts
of appeals is invalid because it is not subject to specific standards
(such as subject matter limitations) governing its exercise also can be
safely ignored.77 Congress can and does delegate its powers to enti-
ties outside of the legislative branch of government, administrative
agencies being the prime recipients of these delegated powers.78 Al-
though earlier cases held that this delegation was invalid unless Con-
gress set "standards" by which the delegated authority was
exercised, 79 delegations without standards now are upheld rou-
tinely.8°
A delegation of power to the courts of appeals differs from a
delegation to administrative agencies in one important respect, how-
ever. Administrative agencies, like Congress, are "above" the public
in the sense that they can make rules and regulations that all people
must obey, while the people cannot exercise any control over agen-
cies.81 In contrast, the Supreme Court has direct control over certain
areas of lower court activity. For example, the Supreme Court
prescribes rules of practice and procedure for all federal courts.
82
76. For an exhaustive discussion of congressional power over federal court jurisdiction,
see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 30, at 309-418.
77. It can be said that the certification procedure does contain at least some standards,
albeit ones not containing subject matter limits. Only a "question" may be certified, and that
question must be "of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1254(3) (1970).
78. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 20-2.01 (3d ed. 1972). [Here-
inafter cited as K. DAVIS].
79. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
80. See, e.g., American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 344 U.S. 298 (1953). See
generally K. DAVIS, supra note 78, § 2.03.
81. Indeed, at times administrative agencies act as if they were beyond the control of
Congress. A fairly recent example is the action by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Fire-
arms (BATF), which laid the groundwork for national, centralized registration of firearms
despite the fact that Congress, by an overwhelming majority, voted not to provide the BATF
with funds requested to implement the computerized central registration system. See New
York Times, May 27, 1978, at 7, col. 1; June 8, 1978, at 11, col. 1, See also R. NISBET, THE
TWILIGHT OF AUTHORITY 57 (1975).
82. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970). There is also an ill-defined general supervisory power.
See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). One commentator has argued that the power
extends to the removal of lower court judges. Shartel, Federal Judges - Appointment, Supervi-
sion and Removal - Some Possibilities Under the Constitution, 28 MICH. L. REV. 870 (1930),
discussed in Comment, The Limitations ofArtiele III on the Proposed Judicial Removal Machin-
ery." § 1506, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1064, 1085 (1970).
Thus, giving the lower courts authority over the Supreme Court,
even in a limited area, disrupts the pre-existing line of authority,
whereas no equivalent disruption occurs when Congress delegates
power to an administrative agency.83
Hence, the argument could be made that letting Congress grant
the lower courts power over the Supreme Court, which is created by
the constitution as one of the three branches of government, violates
the principle of separation of powers, or at least impermissibly ex-
halts the lower court over the higher court. This argument can be
answered, however, by examining the nature of the power granted.
The lower court cannot reverse or supervise the Supreme Court. All
that it can do is demand an answer to a question. Moreover, this
"power" is not only limited, but it is a power that the district courts
have over the courts of appeals in a very real sense. Courts of ap-
peals jurisdiction is mandatory84 in a far stricter sense than that in
which certified questions are mandatory. 85 Thus, when one argues
that allowing certifications is allowing a role reversal between the
Supreme Court and the courts of appeals, one is really saying that
the Supreme Court outranks the courts of appeals in a special,
greater way than the courts of appeals outrank the district courts.
The Supreme Court has been raised to such a pinnacle that all
feel uncomfortable in allowing any actions of the lower courts to
affect it. Yet, as this brief analysis shows, that lofty position is not
required by reasons of ordinance in the court system.
2. Certified Questions Present Abstract Issues.-Certification also
has been objected to because it allegedly produces abstract ques-
tions.86 In one sense this criticism is accurate since any question is
more abstract than the entire case out of which it arose. Beyond this
83. When Congress delegates power to an administrative agency, as far as the public is
concerned, it is simply a transfer of power between co-equals in the hierarchy, especially if the
agency is classified within the executive branch.
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970); Fed. R. App. P. 3, 4.
85. Actually, to say that the Court's jurisdiction is mandatory is not really accurate. The
Supreme Court's jurisdiction is unlike typical appellate court jurisdiction, which is obligatory
in the sense that the court must "decide on the merits any appeal filed with it that comes within
its jurisdiction." G. CASPER & R. POSNER, THE WORKLOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT 1
(1976). Rather, the Court's jurisdiction is essentially discretionary.
Most cases in the Supreme Court are commenced by the filing of a petition for a writ
of certiorari, which is simply a request that the Court exercise its discretion to decide
the case on the merits.
Some cases are commenced by the filing of an appeal rather than a petition for a
writ of certiorari. As to these cases the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is formally obli-
gatory, but in fact the Court frequently treats the filing of an appeal as a request for
review that it feels free to deny as if the case were before it on certiorari. The juris-
diction that is obligatory in form is discretionary in fact, and the initial filing in an
appeal - the 'jurisdictional statement" - is the practical equivalent of a petition for
certiorari. Thus it would be only a slight exaggeration to describe the entire jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court as discretionary.
Id at 1 (footnotes omitted).
86. See, C. WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 534.
truism, however, the objection of abstractness lacks force. First, if
the Court wishes, it can have the entire record of the case brought up
on the certification proceeding.8 7 Second, the Court itself has re-
fused to entertain questions that it deemed "abstract" or "hypotheti-
cal."18 8 Last, certification need produce no more abstract a question
than that now encountered through certiorari. The Court has the
power to limit the grant of certiorari to certain given questions or
issues, rather than accepting the whole case.89 It is hard to see why a
certified question is per se abstract when the same question arising
on certiorari is not.
3. Cert/cation is Not Necessary.-As noted earlier,90 the argument
can be made that certification is simply surplusage, since even the
"hardest case" can be handled without it. Nevertheless, even if it is
unnecessary, no reason has been advanced showing why an express
statutory procedure should be jettisoned in favor of expanded use of
the extraordinary writs. Moreover, certiorari and the extraordinary
writs issue at the behest of a party; certification, on the other hand, is
for the lower court itself. This unique function justifies the contin-
ued existence and use of the procedure.
One could also argue that certification is superfluous since if a
question before the court of appeals is important enough, the
Supreme Court will take the case on certiorari, and if the question is
not 'cert-worthy,' there is no reason to allow the lower court to com-
pel a Supreme Court decision.9' The first and obvious reply to this
argument is that Congress determines the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court92 and has expressly authorized the certification
procedure.93 The principle of docket autonomy is simply not opera-
tive. Congress acted to define the range over which this autonomy
can operate and has excluded certified questions from that range.
Furthermore, even if the certification procedure is not clearly within
the congressional power over the Supreme Court, the Court does ex-
ercise discretion regarding which certificates to accept and is not
'compelled' to make a decision at all. Thus, it is at least questionable
whether certiorari, a party-oriented remedy, can be made to substi-
tute for the court-oriented remedy of certification.
On some occasions a case that has once been certified will again
87. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(3) (1970).
88. See text accompanying notes 23-25, supra.
89. See R. STERN & G. GREssmN, supra note 33, at § 5.10.
90. See text accompanying notes 48-70, supra.
91. This argument is based on the principle of Supreme Court docket autonomy. See
text accompanying notes 71-85, supra.
92. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.2.
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(3) (1970).
reach the Supreme Court on certiorari. Ironically, in both of the
leading cases in which this occurred the certificates were accepted
and answered.94 This additional review is exceptional since it means
that the Supreme Court, having once determined the governing prin-
ciple of law, is now reviewing facts that the court of appeals felt were
settled. This review is, in fact, very rare.95
B. Effects of Abolition
One must ask what the results of abolishing certification would
be for the courts. The extraordinary writs could relieve some of the
load that abolition of certifications would create, but they are truly
'extraordinary' and, therefore, rarely issued.96 They could be of use
to the occasional litigant who obtains one,97 but it is difficult to see
how they could help a lower court at all.
The point remains that statutory certiorari and the extra ordi-
nary writs are not the tools that can be used by a lower court to help
it decide a case before it. They are of scant help to a court of appeals
that feels a duty to decide this case correctly, now. Although, as a
last resort, a court of appeals could write an opinion that deliberately
cries out for Supreme Court review,9" this technique, even when it
results in the Supreme Court's taking the case, is not a satisfactory
alternative to certification. Certification allows the court of appeals
to ask the Supreme Court a question. If the certificate is accepted,
that question is answered. The scope of certiorari, by contrast, is
wide open. The Court may well take a case and decide it, while
totally ignoring the one question upon which the lower court needed
guidance.99
Furthermore, no matter how outrageous the court of appeals'
opinion may be in a case, the Supreme Court may decide not to
review it at that time. Instead, the Court may want to wait for an-
94. Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 417 U.S. 622 (1974) (answering certificate), on re-
mand, 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973), vacated, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Korematsu v. United States,
319 U.S. 432 (1943) (answering certificate), on remand, 140 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1943), afl'd, 323
U.S. 214 (1944).
95. Moore & Vestal, supra note 3, at 41-42 n.189, make the same point.
96. See Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 520 (1956); Ex Parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258,
259 (1947).
97. See generally Note, Federal Court Review by Extraordinary Writ. A Clogged Safety
Valve in the Final Judgment Rule, 63 YALE L.J. 105 (1953).
98. A brief reference to this practice, along with the remarkably tortuous history of one
case employing it, appears in Moore & Vestal, supra note 3, at 37 & n.158. The complexity
and waste of judicial resources that the practice entails are staggering. Id
99. See C. WiorT, supra note 9, at 552. Perhaps the most famous case in which the
Supreme Court ignored what the parties (and the lower court) considered to be the main issue
was Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The railroad, in petitioning for certio-
rari, explicitly declined to question the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842),
relying solely on a construction of local law. Needless to say, the Court ignored the local law
question, but overruled Swift v. Tyson anyway--rather to the surprise of the parties. See C.
Wnorrr, supra note 9, at § 55.
other circuit to pass on the issue. In addition, there is something
awry in the judicial process when a judge feels that he has to write a
"bad" opinion or slant an opinion one way to have an important
question reviewed. The courts of appeals are expected to resolve
problems as best they can, not create them by writing erroneous
opinions to obtain Supreme Court review.
C. Positive Aspects of Cerqfication
Certification is a tool solely for the benefit of the lower courts
that employ it, not the litigants who benefit by it.100 Through certifi-
cation a court of appeals is able to make final decisions in cases in
which the law is so unclear that the judges feel the need for authori-
tative guidance in the matter. Moreover, the procedure permits
many cases to be resolved finally at the court of appeals level while
avoiding the time and expense of petitioning the Supreme Court, a
burden both on the litigants and the high court itself. Finally, the
key advantage of certification is that it leaves the question of when to
ask for help to the judges of lower courts themselves. They decide
whether to resolve the problem themselves and hope for Supreme
Court review at a later date' 0 1 or to ask for binding instructions
while the case is still before them. In contrast, the lower court can-
not petition for mandamus against itself, nor can it seek review of its
own decision. These tools are reserved to the parties in the case.
And although this lower court power vis-a-vis the Supreme Court
might raise problems if Supreme Court jurisdiction truly were
mandatory, current practice indicates that the procedure is discre-
tionary and does not really threaten the supremacy of the Supreme
Court.
V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court has, perhaps, overly narrowed the proce-
dure 0 2 so that only certain concrete, limited questions, essential to
the case, not matters of discretion, and (although never articulated
by the Court) arising out of a case of some importance may be certi-
fied. Given these restrictions there is no good reason intentionally to
keep the law unsettled in cases in which certification is proper. The
courts of appeals should not be deprived of access to their most bind-
ing and authoritative guide in construing the law.
100. See, e.g., Rutherford v. American Medical Ass'n, 379 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1967); Ger-
man Ins. Co. v. Hearne, 118 F. 134 (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1902).
101. Some commentators have forcefully argued that this delayed Supreme Court review
is inadequate to ever really settle the law. See, e.g., Griswold, The Needfor a Court of Tax
Appeals, 52 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1156 (1944).
102. See text accompanying note 34 supra
It is true that certification does reduce the Supreme Court's au-
tonomy to some extent. The Court can either accept or dismiss a
certified question; it cannot rewrite it or substitute one nearer to its
hearts' desire. But when this objection is weighed against the fact
that certification is the sole means by which lower courts can invoke
Supreme Court guidance, the slight loss of high court autonomy is
not a valid reason to jettison the procedure.
In this writer's view, the certification procedure should be re-
tained in its present form. Since the current practice allows the
Court to judge both the form and the importance of the questions
certified in making its determination whether to accept them, main-
taining the procedure would not appear to be too great a burden for
the high court to bear. As a kind of "appeal for the lower courts,"
certification serves a unique and desirable function. This function is
the one directed by Congress when it enacted the certification provi-
sion. 103 Taking all of these factors into account, the best reasoned
conclusion is that although certification may not be strictly neces-
sary, it still is wise. Until its folly can be demonstrated, the proce-
dure should be preserved.
103. See Moore & Vestal, supra note 3, at 14.
